TALKIN’ ‘BOUT MY LITIGATION - HOW THE
ATTORNEY RESPONSE TO AN AUDIT INQUIRY
LETTER DISCLOSES AS LITTLE AS POSSIBLE
M. Eric Anderson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyers and accountants are different professionals in many ways. For
accountants, most of their work is black or white. In providing services to a client,
an accountant must comply with a wide array of rules concerning a client’s financial
accounting and tax reporting. Compliance with accounting principles and auditing
standards is just one of the items an accountant must evaluate in reviewing a
company’s financial statements. In addition, an accountant’s client must comply
with voluminous and highly complex tax laws. Most of these standards set forth the
“right” way to account for any given financial statement item. While an accountant
must still use professional judgment in estimating such items as bad debt reserves or
depreciation allowances, the rules are fairly black and white for a majority of financial
accounting decisions. For example, balance sheets must balance at the end of the
day. The accountant must perform a search for unrecorded liabilities and make an
accrual for any unrecorded amounts discovered. An accountant works hand in hand
with the client to produce accurate financial statements.
For lawyers, however, things have always been greyer. For every cause of
action, there are two sides to the story. Two lawyers, looking at the same set of
facts, will make a different argument concerning liability depending on whether they
sit on the plaintiff’s or defendant’s side of the courtroom. In addition, lawyers exist
in an inherently adversarial environment. While a trial might clearly evidence this
two-party conflict, business transactions also require an attorney to pursue his
client’s needs at the expense of the other side. Whether in a trial or transactional
setting, lawyers guard their clients’ confidences vigorously and avoid disclosure of
key information to any other party. Therefore, an attorney’s reluctance to disclose
any meaningful information in his or her response to an audit inquiry letter is
understandable. In the context of responding to an audit inquiry letter, an attorney’s
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most basic fear is that any evaluation or assessment of a client’s liability, or any
estimate that the attorney might make, concerning a specific claim will be disclosed
to an adversarial party and used against the client in a subsequent court proceeding.
Over the past twenty years, court cases have validated this fear.
For lawyers, the audit inquiry letter has become a necessary evil. Inevitably,
the attorney’s response to the audit inquiry letter is one of the last open items that an
accountant attempts to wrap up at the end of audit field work. The response that is
eventually received, however, may not actually be that useful to the accountant in
evaluating loss contingencies. Most responses only result in verifying claims that the
client has already disclosed to the auditor. In most instances, the auditor could
actually obtain more information just by reviewing the pleadings filed at the local
courthouse. One might say the attorney’s response says a lot while at the same time
saying nothing at all.
Perhaps acknowledging some flaws in the current methods, the Auditing
Standards Board formed a “Legal Inquiry Letters Reeducation Task Force.”1 Jointly
comprised of members from the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(“AICPA”) and members of the American Bar Association (“ABA”), the task force
was “established to address concerns regarding language used by auditors in audit
inquiry letters . . . and responses by attorneys to those letters.”2 Unfortunately, this
task force was disbanded before taking any action.
This article will examine whether the attorney’s response to the audit inquiry
letter serves any meaningful purpose. In addition, this article considers attorneys’
concerns when responding to audit inquiry letters and evaluates the validity of these
concerns. Part I of this article reviews the current financial accounting and auditing
standards that relate to audit inquiry letters and reviews the underlying purpose of
the audit inquiry letter. In addition, Part I summarizes the ABA Statement of Policy
that relates to attorneys’ responses to audit inquiry letters. Part II summarizes the
major elements of the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine – two
legal principles that underlie a majority of cases involving audit-inquiry letters. Part
II also looks at the significant court cases involving the issue of audit inquiry letters
over the years. Part III analyzes whether the fundamental purpose of the audit
inquiry letter is being served. In addition, Part III looks at the validity of attorneys’
fears of audit inquiry letters and how their responses to these letters could be
Highlights of Technical Activities, 20 IN OUR OPINION……..,: THE NEWSLETTER
AUDIT AND ATTEST STANDARDS GROUP 12 (2004).
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changed in the future. Finally, Part IV concludes that serving the purposes of the
audit inquiry letter requires more forthcoming responses from attorneys.
II. REVIEWING THE GROUND RULES
A. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5:
Accounting for Contingencies
Established in 1973, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”)
promulgates generally accepted accounting principles in the United States. Generally
accepted accounting principles are financial accounting rules that have received
substantial authoritative support.3 Preparation of a company’s financial statements
must conform to generally accepted accounting principles, which reflect
the consensus at a particular time as to which economic resources
and obligations should be recorded as assets and liabilities…, which
changes in assets and liabilities should be recorded, when these
changes should be recorded, how the assets and liabilities and
changes in them should be measured, what information should be
disclosed and how it should be disclosed, and which financial
statements should be prepared.4
In March 1975, the FASB issued Statement No. 5, which governs accounting
for contingencies.5 A loss contingency6 is defined as “an existing condition,
situation, or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possible . . . loss . . . to
an enterprise that will ultimately be resolved when one or more future events occur
or fail to occur.”7 In assessing whether a loss contingency involving litigation,
3

4

Statement No. 4, § 1026.01 n.1 (AICPA Accounting Principles Bd. 1970).
Id. at § 1026.01.

5 ACCOUNTING FOR CONTINGENCIES, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 1975) (hereinafter “SFAS No. 5”).

The loss contingency that an auditor attempts to address in sending the audit inquiry letter is
pending or threatened litigation. Other examples of loss contingencies include collectibility of
receivables, obligations related to product warranties and product defects, and guarantees of
indebtedness of others. However, these other types of loss contingencies are not considered within
the scope of this article.
6

7

SFAS No. 5, ¶1.
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claims, or assessments (whether asserted or unasserted) requires accrual and/or
disclosure in the financial statements, the auditor must evaluate the following factors:
“(a) The period in which the underlying cause . . . of the pending or threatened
litigation or of the actual or possible claim or assessment occurred[;] (b) The degree
of probability of an unfavorable outcome[;] (c) The ability to make a reasonable
estimate of the amount of loss.”8
A loss contingency is classified as being probable, reasonably possible, or
remote, based upon the likelihood that the future event confirming the existence of a
loss will occur.9 A loss contingency is considered probable if “[t]he future event or
events are likely to occur.”10 A loss contingency is classified as reasonably possible if
“[t]he chance of the future event or events occurring is more than remote but less
than likely.”11 A loss contingency is deemed remote if “[t]he chance of the future
event or events occurring is slight.”12 Instead of specifying percentage guidelines to
help classify a loss contingency, the FASB requires the auditor to exercise
professional judgment.
The auditor’s classification of a loss contingency as either probable,
reasonably possible, or remote determines how the loss contingency will be handled
in the financial statements. A loss contingency is accrued, meaning charged against
income, if (1) “[i]nformation available prior to issuance of the financial statements
indicates that [the loss contingency] is probable” and (2) “[t]he amount of loss can be
reasonably estimated.”13 Absolute certainty of a loss is not required; the likelihood
need only be classified as probable.14 In addition to accruing the loss, the auditor
may need to make a disclosure explaining the nature of the accrual.15

8

Id. ¶33.

9

Id. ¶3.

10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Id.

13

Id. ¶8.

14

Id. ¶84.

15

Id. ¶9.
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The auditor should disclose a loss contingency in the footnotes of the
financial statements if the likelihood of occurrence is classified as reasonably
possible.16 The disclosure should identify the “nature of the contingency” and “give
an estimate of the possible loss.”17 In the event the exact amount of the loss is not
known, the disclosure should indicate the possible range of loss or state that no
estimate of the loss is possible.18 Disclosure is required for unasserted claims or
assessments if the assertion of a claim is probable and the likelihood that the
outcome will be unfavorable is reasonably possible.19 In some instances, a loss
arising after the date of the financial statements might require disclosure to prevent
the financial statements of the company from being misleading.20 A loss contingency
categorized as remote does not generally require disclosure in the financial
statements.21
B. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 12
Subsequent to the promulgation of SFAS No. 5, both the accounting and
legal professions issued guidance that addressed audit inquiry letters. The Auditing
Standards Board, a technical committee of the AICPA, develops Statements of
Auditing Standards.22 Statement on Auditing Standards No. 12, Inquiry of a Client’s
Lawyer Concerning Litigation, Claims, and Assessments, was approved on January 7,
1976, and “provides guidance on the procedures an independent auditor should
consider for identifying litigation.”23 When assessing litigation, the auditor should
obtain information concerning the following factors:

16

Id. ¶10.

17

Id.

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Id. ¶11.

21

See generally, SFAS No. 5.

22

JACK E. KIGER & JAMES H. SCHEINER, AUDITING 41 (1994).

INQUIRY OF A CLIENT’S LAWYER CONCERNING LITIGATION, CLAIMS, AND ASSESSMENTS,
Statement of Auditing Standards No. 12, ¶1 (Auditing Standards Bd. 1976) (hereinafter “SAS No.
12”).
23
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a. The existence of a condition, situation, or set of circumstances
indicating an uncertainty as to the possible loss to an entity arising
from litigation, claims, and assessments.
b. The period in which the underlying cause for legal action occurred.
c. The degree of probability of an unfavorable outcome.
d. The amount or range of potential loss.24
As part of the audit procedures, the auditor discusses litigation with company
management to ensure that litigation existing as of the balance sheet date is identified
and disclosed in the financial statements in accordance with SFAS No. 5.25 The
auditor sends an audit inquiry letter to the lawyer as a means of confirming litigation,
claims, and assessments identified by management.26
C. The Audit Inquiry Letter
In many ways, the audit inquiry letter is similar to other confirmation letters
sent to third parties during the course of a financial audit. Just as a cash
confirmation confirms the bank balance of company cash accounts at the end of the
year, the audit inquiry letter serves as corroboration of management’s representations
concerning litigation.27 The audit inquiry letter is written on management’s
letterhead and mailed to the attorney by the accountant. The lawyer returns the
response directly to the accountant.
The audit inquiry letter should identify the company and any subsidiaries
being audited and the corresponding audit period.28 The letter will request the
attorney to confirm information that the client has provided to the auditors
24

SAS No. 12, ¶4.

25

Id. ¶5(d).

26 Id. The audit inquiry letter is only one of many auditing procedures performed to identify and
evaluate litigation. Other audit procedures include reviewing minutes of stockholder meetings and
board of directors; reading important documents, such as contracts, loan agreements, and leases; and
identifying possible guarantees. SAS No. 12, ¶7.
27

SAS No. 12, ¶8.

28

Id. at ¶9(a).
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concerning pending or threatened litigation, claims, and assessments.29 Alternatively,
in the event management does not prepare a list of pending litigation, the letter will
request that the lawyer prepare the list.30
Pending litigation is restricted to actions “with respect to which the lawyer
has been engaged and to which he has devoted substantive attention on behalf of the
company in the form of legal consultation or representation.”31 The list of pending
litigation should describe the nature of the litigation, including the proceeding, claim,
or claims asserted, amount of damages sought, and whether the damages are covered
by insurance.32 In addition, the list should identify the progress of the case (such as
whether the case is during the discovery, trial, or appeal phase) as well as the action
the company plans to take regarding the litigation (such as “to contest the matter
vigorously or to seek an out-of-court settlement”).33 The list should also specify the
likelihood of an “unfavorable outcome” for each pending claim and make an
estimate concerning “the amount or range of [any] potential loss.”34
Management should prepare a list of unasserted claims and assessments that
it “considers to be probable of assertion, and that, if asserted, would have at least a
reasonable possibility of an unfavorable outcome.”35 Like pending litigation,
unasserted litigation is similarly restricted to matters for which the attorney has been
engaged36 and to which he has devoted substantive attention in conjunction with
representing the company. The lawyer is asked to comment on the list of unasserted
claims only if his description or evaluation of the matter differs from the client’s.37

29

Id. at ¶9(b).

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Id. at ¶9(d)(1).

33

Id.

34

Id. at ¶9(d)(2).

35

Id. at ¶9(c).

36

Id.

37

Id. at ¶9(e).
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The audit inquiry letter also requests the attorney to confirm that, in the
event an unasserted possible claim comes to his attention during the course of
providing legal services to the client, the attorney will consult with the client
regarding disclosure and compliance with the requirements of SFAS No. 5.38 While
the audit inquiry letter can be restricted to material litigation, the client, auditor, and
lawyer must each understand any materiality limitations.39 Finally, the audit inquiry
letter should “request that the lawyer specifically identify the nature of and reasons
for any limitation on his response.”40
D. ABA Statement of Policy
Around the same time the Auditing Standards Board was developing SAS
No. 12, the ABA was writing similar guidelines for lawyers concerning the
recommended approach for responding to an audit inquiry letter. On December 8,
1975, the ABA’s Board of Governors approved the ABA Statement of Policy
Regarding Lawyers’ Responses to Auditors’ Requests for Information (the “ABA
Statement”).41 While auditors must comply with the requirements of both SFAS No.
5 and SAS No. 12, attorneys are not required to follow the ABA Statement when
responding to audit inquiry letters. The ABA Statement is merely a guide.42
The ABA Statement opens with a Preamble that comes across as both
cautionary and defensive. The opening line of the ABA Statement proclaims, “The
public interest in protecting the confidentiality of lawyer-client communications is
fundamental.”43 The ABA Statement warns that the attorney’s disclosure of lawyer-

Id. at ¶9(f). “In some circumstances, a lawyer may be required . . . to resign his engagement if his
advice concerning financial accounting and reporting for litigation, claims, and assessments is
disregarded by the client.” Id. at ¶11.
38

39

SFAS No. 12, ¶9.

40 Id. at ¶9(h). A lawyer’s refusal to comply with the requests made in the audit inquiry letter would be
considered a scope limitation that prevents issuance of an unqualified audit opinion. Id. at ¶13.
41 American Bar Association, Statement of Policy Regarding Responses to Auditors’ Requests for Information
(1975), in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AUDITOR’S LETTER HANDBOOK 4 (2003) (hereinafter
“AUDITOR’S LETTER HANDBOOK” “Statement of Policy”). The Statement of Policy can also be found at 31
BUS. LAWYER 1709 (1976).
42

AUDITOR’S LETTER HANDBOOK, supra note 41, Statement of Policy ¶8, at 9.

43

AUDITOR’S LETTER HANDBOOK, supra note 41, Statement of Policy Preamble, at 4.
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client information to the auditor “may significantly impair the client’s ability in other
contexts to maintain the confidentiality of such communications.”44
While recognizing the importance of investors’ ability to rely on accurate and
complete financial statements, the Preamble asserts that this public policy goal
should not undermine the attorney-client relationship.45 The ABA Statement
acknowledges that attorneys are most likely the best resource for obtaining
information about claims that have been asserted, but strongly admonishes that “it is
not in the public interest for the lawyer to be required to respond to general inquiries
from auditors concerning possible claims.”46
Before replying to the auditor’s request for information, the lawyer should
verify that the client representative who signed the audit inquiry letter is authorized
to consent to the lawyer’s disclosure of information to the auditor.47 The lawyer may
limit his or her response to the auditor in several ways. For example, the response
need cover only matters that are “individually or collectively material” to the financial
statements and to which the lawyer has given “substantive attention” via legal
representation or consultation for the period covered by the audit.48 The lawyer may
also limit the response by stating that the reply is intended only for the auditor’s
information, thus preventing dissemination of the lawyer’s response to other
individuals.49 Because these limitations are referenced specifically in the ABA
Statement, they do not have to be explicitly stated in the attorney’s reply. If the
attorney’s response is limited by information contained in the ABA Statement,
however, the response should contain appropriate language indicating this limitation
and should reference the full title of the ABA Statement.50
Upon receipt of a proper client request, the lawyer may report the following
matters to the auditor:
44

Id.

45

Id. at 4-5.

46

Id. at 5.

47

See AUDITOR’S LETTER HANDBOOK, supra note 41, Statement of Policy ¶1, at 5.

48

Id. ¶¶2,3, at 6.

49

See id. ¶7, at 9.

50

See id. ¶8, at 9.
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(a) overtly threatened or pending litigation, whether or not specified by the
client;
(b) a contractually assumed obligation which the client has specifically
identified and upon which the client has specifically requested, in
the inquiry letter or a supplement thereto, comment to the
auditor;
(c) an unasserted possible claim or assessment which the client has
specifically identified and upon which the client has specifically
requested, in the inquiry letter or a supplement thereto, comment
to the auditor.51
As the above language indicates, items (b) and (c) require that the client specifically
identify these items in the audit inquiry letter in order for the attorney to comment
on them. Regarding unasserted possible claims, the client should only ask the
attorney to comment on a matter if the claim is probable of assertion and there is a
reasonable possibility that the outcome will be both unfavorable and material to the
financial statements.52
For matters that require the communication of information to the auditor,
the lawyer may disclose the “identification of the proceedings or matter, the stage of
proceedings, the claim(s) asserted, and the position taken by the client.”53 The ABA
Statement cautions attorneys that an adverse party may assert the attorney’s
evaluation of a claim as an admission at a later date.54 In addition, the Statement
advises lawyers against predicting the outcome of claims “except in those relatively
few clear cases where it appears to the lawyer that an unfavorable outcome is either
‘probable’ or ‘remote.’”55 In classifying the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome,
the ABA Statement uses the terms “probable” and “remote,” but it does not use
“reasonably possible” as used in SFAS No. 5. In addition, the ABA Statement
defines “probable” and “remote” differently from SFAS No. 5. An unfavorable
outcome is considered probable “if the prospects of the claimant not succeeding are
judged to be extremely doubtful and the prospects for success by the client in its

51

Id. ¶5, at 6-7.

52

See id. at 7.

53

Id.

54

Id. ¶1(c), at 6.

55

Id. ¶5, at 8.
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defense are judged to be slight."56 An unfavorable outcome is considered remote “if
the prospects for the client not succeeding in its defense are judged to be extremely
doubtful and the prospects of success by the claimant are judged to be slight.”57 The
Commentary to the ABA Statement states more broadly that “in most situations, an
unfavorable outcome will be neither ‘probable’ nor ‘remote’ as defined.”58 In other
words, furnishing judgments to the auditor about the outcome of litigation is
unnecessary in most situations.
Likewise, although the lawyer may specify an estimated dollar amount of a
“probable” loss, the ABA Statement discourages the lawyer from doing so. “[T]he
amount or range of potential loss will normally be as inherently impossible to
ascertain, with any degree of certainty, as the outcome of the litigation.”59 The ABA
Statement recommends that a lawyer specify a dollar amount only if the likelihood
that the loss estimate will be incorrect is slight.60 The lawyer should rarely provide a
specific estimate of a loss amount for unasserted claims and assessments.61 “[A]
decision to treat an unasserted claim as ‘probable’ of assertion should be based only
upon ‘compelling judgment.’”62
The ABA acknowledges that an attorney has a professional responsibility to
refrain from knowingly assisting a client in violating securities laws and may be
required to resign as counsel in the event the client disregards advice concerning
disclosures.63 In fact, the auditor may assume that when the lawyer becomes aware
of unasserted possible claim or assessments potentially requiring disclosure, he or she
will discuss the need for disclosure and the applicable SFAS No. 5 requirements with
the client.64 More specifically, the lawyer should encourage the client to disclose an
56

Id.

57

Id.

58

AUDITOR’S LETTER HANDBOOK, supra note 41, Statement of Policy Commentary, at 17.

59

AUDITOR’S LETTER HANDBOOK, supra note 41, Statement of Policy ¶5, at 8.

60

Id.

61

See id.

62

AUDITOR’S LETTER HANDBOOK, supra note 41, Statement of Policy Commentary, at 17.

63

AUDITOR’S LETTER HANDBOOK, supra note 41, Statement of Policy ¶6, at 8.

64

Id. at 8-9.
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unasserted possible claim or assessment to the auditor if the lawyer feels that “(i) the
client has no reasonable basis to conclude that assertion of the claim is not probable .
. . and (ii) given the probability of assertion, disclosure of the loss contingency in the
client’s financial statements is beyond reasonable dispute required.”65
III. WHAT’S TO BE SCARED OF?: LOOKING AT THE CASE LAW
A. The Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine
The ABA Statement strongly emphasizes the importance of the attorneyclient relationship and continually advises attorneys on how to limit their responses
to audit inquiry letters. The motivating factor behind this emphasis is the fear that
the attorney’s judgment concerning liability might subsequently be used or disclosed
in a future court action. In the twenty-five years since SFAS No. 5, SAS No. 12, and
the ABA Statement were promulgated, relatively few court decisions have addressed
audit inquiry letters. Almost all of the cases that do address them focus exclusively
on their discoverability and whether either the attorney-client privilege or the work
product doctrine can be invoked to protect the audit inquiry letter from discovery.
The attorney-client privilege serves to protect confidential communications
between a client and his lawyer and allows the client to make full disclosure to his
lawyer when discussing legal matters. The Supreme Court has stated that the
purpose of the privilege is “to encourage full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the
observance of law and administration of justice.”66 When applying the attorneyclient privilege in federal courts, judges look to the development of the privilege
under the common law.67 At its most basic level, the attorney-client privilege
requires that the “communication be made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining
legal advice from the lawyer.”68 For example, a client cannot use the attorney-client

65

AUDITOR’S LETTER HANDBOOK, supra note 41, Statement of Policy Commentary, at 18.

66

Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).

See FED. R. EVID. 501 (stating that the federal privilege law is guided by “the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience”).

67

68

United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d. Cir. 1961) (emphasis in original).
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privilege to keep opposing counsel from discovering the underlying facts of a case
merely by communicating them to his or her attorney.69
The attorney-client privilege may be destroyed in the event that any part of
the confidential communication is subsequently disclosed to a third-party.
To retain the attorney-client privilege, the confidentiality surrounding
the communications made in that relationship must be preserved.
The purpose of the privilege is to foster full client disclosure to the
lawyer; the privilege exists to assure the client that his private
disclosures will not become common knowledge. The need to cloak
these communications with secrecy, however, ends when the secrets
pass through the client’s lips to others. Thus, a breach of
confidentiality forfeits the client’s right to claim the privilege.70
When determining if the privilege has been waived as a whole, courts look to
whether the disclosure represented a significant part of the prior communication.71
The genesis of the work product doctrine can be found in the Supreme
Court decision Hickman v. Taylor.72
In Hickman, an attorney attempted to obtain
opposing counsel’s notes from witness interviews he had conducted in preparation
for trial.73 The court noted that “memoranda, statements and mental impressions . . .
fall outside the scope of the attorney-client privilege and . . . [could] not [be]
protected from discovery on that basis.”74 In carving out the work product doctrine,
the Court stated that “[n]ot even the most liberal of discovery theories can justify
unwarranted inquiries into the files and the mental impressions of an attorney.”75
While the work product doctrine shelters a lawyer’s research, analysis, legal theories,
69 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395-96 (quoting Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830,
831 (E.D. Pa. 1962)).
70

United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 539 (5th Cir. 1982).

71

Id. at 538 (quoting United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1043 (5th Cir. 1981)).

72

329 U.S. 495 (1947).

73

Id. at 497.

74

Id. at 508.

75

Id. at 510.
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and mental impressions; the Court pointed out that, just like the attorney-client
privilege, the client could not use the work product doctrine to withhold relevant and
non-privileged facts that are contained within the attorney’s materials.76
The work product doctrine espoused in Hickman was later incorporated into
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as Rule 26(b)(3).77 Limitations exist, however,
regarding work product protection. For example, the doctrine is limited to
protecting “materials assembled and brought into being in anticipation of
litigation.”78 As stated in the Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, “Materials assembled in the ordinary course of business, or pursuant
to public requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other nonlitigation purposes are
not under the qualified immunity provided by [Rule 26(b)(3)].”79 One of the
differences between the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine is
that all confidential communications between the client and the lawyer are protected
under the attorney-client privilege, while only those documents created during the
course of or preparing for litigation are protected under the work product doctrine.
Like the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine is not an
absolute privilege and can be waived.80 Unlike the attorney-client privilege, however,
disclosure to a third party does not necessarily result in the waiver of the privilege
under the work product doctrine.81 A waiver occurs only if the disclosure allows the
opponent to gain access to the information.82 “[W]hen the disclosure is either
inadvertent or made to a non-adversary, it is appropriate to ask whether the

76

Id. at 511.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) (“the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning
the litigation”).

77

78

El Paso Co., 682 F.2d at 542.

FED R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3) 1970 advisory committee’s note. See also Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc.,
320 F.2d 45, 52 (4th Cir. 1963).

79

80

United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975).

81

Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir. 1991).

82

Id.
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circumstances surrounding the disclosure evidenced conscious disregard of the
possibility that an adversary might obtain the protected materials.”83
The following section will discuss how the courts have addressed the issue of
audit inquiry letters’ discoverability. The cases discussed below show how courts rely
heavily on the aforementioned rules concerning the attorney-client privilege and the
work product doctrine when examining issues related to audit inquiry letters.
B. Audit Inquiry Letter Cases
The first relevant case is United States v. El Paso Company.84 While not directly
involving audit inquiry letters, the El Paso court’s analysis and reasoning was later
relied on in subsequent legal opinions of other courts. In El Paso, the Internal
Revenue Service was seeking to enforce a summons regarding certain tax accrual
workpapers of the El Paso Company in conjunction with a tax audit.85 El Paso’s tax
department, which consisted of approximately 80 accountants and 10 attorneys,
calculated these tax accrual workpapers in-house.86 The purpose of the tax accrual
workpapers was “to insure that the corporation sets aside on its balance sheet a
sufficient amount to cover [any] contingent tax liability.”87
El Paso attempted to resist the summons of the tax accrual workpapers by
asserting both the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine.88 As part
of the tax pool analysis performed during the annual financial statement audit, El
Paso disclosed the contents of the tax accrual workpapers to the auditors so that they
might evaluate the adequacy of the tax pool analysis.89 In discussing the attorneyclient privilege, the court found that revealing this information to the outside
auditors destroyed confidentiality with respect to these documents.90 Once the
83

Id. at 1431.

84

682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982).

85

Id. at 532.

86

Id. at 541.

87

Id. at 535.

88

Id. at 538, 542.

89

Id. at 540.

90

Id.
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confidentiality of the information was destroyed, the ability to claim the privilege was
waived.91 Interestingly, the court also noted that there was no way to tell which tax
accrual workpapers had been prepared by tax department attorneys (as opposed to
accountants) such that the privilege would apply.92
In addition to finding that the attorney-client privilege was not available, the
court also determined that the work product doctrine could not prevent El Paso
from complying with the IRS summons.93 The court stated that the tax accrual
workpapers were not prepared in anticipation of litigation, in essence agreeing with
the IRS that the papers were business work instead of legal work.94 The function of
the workpapers was to support a number on the balance sheet and to comply with
SEC regulations; thus they were more closely related to daily business than to
litigation.95 “The primary motivation [of the tax pool analysis] is to anticipate, for
financial reporting purposes, what the impact of litigation [over company tax returns]
might be on the company’s tax liability.”96 One of the flaws in El Paso’s argument,
however, was the fact that an outside firm handled tax litigation matters, and no
indication existed that any of the tax accrual workpapers in question were ever
referred to them.97
Two of the first cases about the discoverability of audit inquiry letters
produced different results in different jurisdictions. In United States v. Arthur Young
& Company,98 the government sought discovery of an audit inquiry letter prepared in
connection with the annual audit of Cities Service Oil and Gas.99 The audit inquiry
letter contained the outside attorney’s analysis and mental impressions regarding a
91
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pending case between Cities Service and the Department of Energy, including the
potential effects of the lawsuit on the financial statements.100 The court found that
the audit inquiry letter was protected by the work product doctrine and that the
privilege had not been waived because “the documents were provided to [the
accounting firm] under a specific assurance of confidentiality.”101 The work product
doctrine protected the letter from discovery because “[t]he audit process required
Cities’ counsel to provide the [outside auditor] with candid assessments and opinions
of pending and potential litigation.”102 The lawyer’s interpretations, mental
impressions, and opinions concerned a matter in litigation or in anticipation of
litigation and were therefore protected under the work product doctrine.103
After losing in the Oklahoma district court in Arthur Young, the government
sought enforcement of a subpoena for the exact same documents in an action
against Gulf Oil Corporation in a Texas district court. 104 Gulf Oil had entered into a
merger agreement with Cities Service.105 After also losing in the Texas district court,
the government appealed the decision to the Temporary Emergency Court of
Appeals.106 Although two district courts in different jurisdictions had found
otherwise, the Court of Appeals ruled that the audit inquiry letter did not qualify for
work product protection.107 The court justified its decision by stating that “[i]f the
primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the document is not to assist in
pending or impending litigation, then a finding that the document enjoys work
product immunity is not mandated.”108 The court determined that the audit inquiry
letter was solely prepared for the business purpose of helping prepare audited
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financial statements that would comply with federal securities laws.109 Citing El Paso
as support for its decision, the court concluded that the audit inquiry letter had not
been prepared “in anticipation of litigation,” which is a requirement for receiving
work product protection.110
Not quite six months later, another district court found a completely
opposite interpretation of the phrase “in anticipation of litigation” in Tronitech, Inc. v.
NCR Corporation.111 Tronitech attempted discovery of an audit letter prepared by
NCR’s counsel for NCR’s accountants that discussed the financial implications of
the lawsuit between NCR and Tronitech.112 In finding that the audit letter was
protected by the work product privilege, the court explained that “[a]n audit letter is
not prepared in the ordinary course of business but rather arises only in the event of
litigation. It is prepared because of the litigation, and it is comprised of the sum total
of the attorney’s conclusions and legal theories concerning that litigation.”113 The
court stated that the Arthur Young court’s decision was based upon the “principles
and purposes underlying the work product doctrine,” while the Gulf Oil decision
relied on interpreting the phrase “prepared in anticipation of litigation” as meaning
“created in order to assist in litigation.”114 The Tronitech court obviously found the
Arthur Young court’s reasoning more convincing.115
In Independent Petrochemical Corporation v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company,116 an
insurance company succeeded in compelling the production of letters written by
Independent’s counsel to its accountants.117 Because the documents in question
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were prepared for the purpose of complying with federal securities laws,118 the
company unsuccessfully argued that the documents were covered by the attorneyclient privilege or the work product doctrine.119 With respect to the attorney-client
privilege, the court concluded that the letters were “clearly . . . written in connection
with the rendering of accounting services.”120 The court stated that the letters “were
not intended to convey confidential attorney-client information, but even if they
were, such a privilege was waived by the disclosure [to the accountants].”121
Regarding the applicability of the work product doctrine, the court found that the
letters “were not prepared to assist [the corporation] in present, or reasonably
anticipated, litigation but rather they were prepared to assist [the accountants] in the
performance of regular accounting work done by such accounting firms.”122 Because
the court determined that the letters were not prepared for litigation purposes, it
ordered production of the documents.123
By the late eighties, lawyers who were not already wary of responding to an
audit inquiry letter took notice after a New York City district judge issued a sealed
opinion involving Drexel Burnham Lambert.124 Drexel Burnham Lambert engaged
attorneys to conduct an internal investigation regarding allegations of securities
fraud.125 The attorneys then subsequently used the information from their
investigation to respond to an audit inquiry letter from Drexel’s independent
auditors.126 The federal prosecutors sought the results of the investigation from
outside counsel by issuing a subpoena.127 The attorneys refused to comply with the
subpoena and argued that the information was protected by the attorney-client
118
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privilege and the work product doctrine.128 In a sealed opinion, the judge ordered
the production of the investigation materials, presumably finding that the attorneys
waived the privileges by discussing the finding of the investigation with the outside
auditors.129 The end result was essentially a subject-matter waiver due to the
information conveyed in the lawyer’s response to the audit inquiry letter.
The ABA quickly responded in December 1989.130 While not mentioning
Drexel Burnham by name, the Report of the Subcommittee on Audit Inquiry
Responses stated that “[b]ecause of a recent court case and other judicial decisions
involving lawyer’s [sic] responses to auditor’s [sic] requests for information, an area
of uncertainty or concern has been brought to the Subcommittee’s attention.”131
Lawyers were advised to encourage clients to put the following sentence in the audit
inquiry letter: “We do not intend that either our request to you to provide
information to our auditor or your response to our auditor should be construed in
any way to constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege or the attorney workproduct privilege.”132 The report also encouraged lawyers to put a similar statement
in their responses to audit inquiry letters.133 The report also acknowledged, however,
that inclusion of this language might not prevent a court from determining that the
client had waived the privileges.134 The AICPA announced that the inclusion of this
anti-waiver language was not considered a scope limitation for audit purposes.135
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Finally, in Vanguard Savings and Loan Association v. Banks,136 the defendants
sought letters prepared by outside counsel in response to an accounting firm’s audit
inquiry letter request for comment on loss contingencies.137 The court ordered the
plaintiffs to produce the letters to the extent that they contained facts concerning the
various loss contingencies but allowed a redaction of any portions of the letter that
contained attorney work product.138 The defendants argued that the work product
privilege should not apply because the letters were not prepared in anticipation of
litigation.139 The court, however, found that the attorneys’ response “contain[ed]
thoughts and conclusions by plaintiffs’ attorneys in evaluating legal claims” and was
thus protected as opinion work product.140 The court noted that the audit inquiry
letter requested information concerning the “‘expected result including any probable
loss’” and found that this request “[c]learly . . . [sought] counsel’s mental impressions
and legal opinions which are protected from disclosure under the work-product
doctrine.”141
IV. TIME FOR REEDUCATION
A. Why Attorneys Are Reluctant to Say More
A review of relevant court decisions shows that the attorney-client privilege
will not protect disclosure of the attorney’s response to the audit inquiry letter. The
primary problem with this privilege is that the attorney is disclosing information to
an outside party (the independent auditor). While the reasoning behind this rule is
understandable, problems arise when courts apply it blindly in an auditing context.
First, in the course of performing an audit, the independent auditor confirms
several types of information with outside parties. For example, it confirms with
banks the year-end cash balances in checking and savings institutions. In addition,
lenders confirm information regarding company loans, including year-end value,
interest rates, covenant violations, and guarantees. Similarly, the audit inquiry letter
136
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attempts to confirm information regarding loss contingencies that the client has
disclosed to the accountant.
Second, both courts and attorneys have historically discounted the
confidentiality inherent in the accountant-client relationship. Rule 301 of the Code
of Professional Conduct, as promulgated by the AICPA, states, “A member in public
practice shall not disclose any confidential client information without the specific
consent of the client.”142 Infraction of any of the rules makes a member liable to
disciplinary action. In addition, although an accountant-client privilege is not
available under the Federal Rules of Evidence; many states, including Tennessee,
provide for such a privilege by statute.143 Like the attorney-client privilege, however,
the accountant-client privilege may be waived if the information is disclosed to third
parties or to the public.144 In confirming client information via the response to the
audit inquiry letter, the attorney must communicate with the auditor. The current
privileges do not allow the attorney to disclose information to the accountants, even
though the client could communicate separately with the attorney and the accountant
and have the information remain privileged in some states. It seems illogical that, by
attempting to confirm the client’s information with the client’s consent, either the
accountant or the attorney can destroy the privilege.
In addition, courts are split on whether responding to the audit inquiry letter
waives the work product privilege. Courts that denied the privilege primarily cited
that the letter was prepared for a business reason and not for litigation purposes.
While this argument certainly has merit, one of the main functions of the document
is to learn about pending or anticipated litigation. The letter provides information
from the client regarding claims and assessments and asks the attorney to assess the
claims. The letter also asks the attorney to estimate an amount or range of loss on
those claims for which he or she has predicted an unfavorable outcome.
To say that requesting this information from the attorney is strictly business
ignores that the underlying purpose is to confirm litigation exposure. The response
to the audit inquiry letter is intimately connected with litigation. “But for” the client
having claims filed against it, for which the accountant needs an evaluation from a
professional familiar with the contingent nature of the matter, the audit inquiry letter
would not be necessary. If a client is not involved in any litigation and the attorney
AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
R. 301 (1988).
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confirms this via a response letter, a subsequent request to discover the audit letter is
a moot point since the response never really disclosed anything. The Tronitech court
seemed to understand that the entire cycle of communications exists only because of
litigation.145 To attempt to classify the document as a business or litigation document
ignores the inherent dual role of the audit inquiry letter. While the letter’s overall
purpose is to ensure adequate financial statements, if it did not fundamentally relate
to litigation matters there would be no need to communicate with the attorney at all.
Although in Vanguard the defendant attempted to argue that the letter was
not created in anticipation of litigation, the court clearly understood the bigger
picture.146 An attorney’s response clearly involves the type of mental impressions,
thoughts, and opinions that should, without question, receive work product
protection because they are blatant evaluations of claims. One possible solution is
for the attorney to specifically qualify and set off the work product portion of his or
her response by stating, “The following information relates to mental impressions,
thoughts, and opinions of the attorney, and in the event this document is
subsequently sought via discovery measures, the following paragraphs should be
redacted from the document before complying with all future discovery requests.”
B. Why the Attorney’s Response to the Audit Inquiry Letter
May Be Inadequate
In Gulf Oil, the defendants resisted disclosing the audit inquiry letter on
policy grounds, stating that without work product protection attorneys will not be
candid in their responses.147 The court dismissed this argument by believing that
attorneys will not violate “legal and ethical obligations to render candid and complete
opinions.”148 An argument exists, however, that courts have forced attorneys to be
less than forthcoming in their responses by denying them work product protection.
The result is an attorney response that contains statements that are nothing more
than disclaimers. An attorney can intentionally word a response to be so vague that
it contains a lot of language that says very little.
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The ABA Policy Statement does not require the attorney to evaluate claims
by classifying them as either “probable” or “remote.”149 In fact, even though these
are the categories used by SFAS No. 5, an attorney is not restricted to these terms in
communicating any evaluation to the auditor.150 The language attorneys were using
caused such confusion that the AICPA eventually issued an interpretation guide to
help “translate” an attorney’s response.151 The guide identified the following legal
language as communicating a “remote” likelihood of an unfavorable outcome to the
auditor: “the possible liability to the company in this proceeding is nominal;” “the
company will be able to defend this action successfully;” and “plaintiff’s case against
the company is without merit.”152 The interpretation also identifies language that is
considered unacceptable and that requires the auditor to follow up with the
attorney.153
The need to translate the attorney’s language used in the response potentially
identifies another area of concern. The possibility that an “expectation gap” exists
between what the auditor requests and what the attorney provides is quite real. For
example, the audit inquiry letter requests disclosure of material litigation. Over the
years, however, accountants themselves have struggled with determining when an
item is material. Materiality is a concept not easily defined. The SEC recently issued
Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99 – Materiality, which criticized the use of qualitative
benchmarks in evaluating whether an item is considered material.154 However,
materiality has both a qualitative and quantitative aspect. Although the audit inquiry
letter specifies a materiality standard, questions still exist concerning whether the
attorney’s view of materiality coincides with the auditor’s view. For example, an
individual claim might be considered immaterial, but it could become material when
viewed collectively with other potential claims.
Finally, the ABA Policy Statement and SFAS No. 5 use different definitions
for the terms “probable” and “remote.” These different definitions may make it
149
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easier for attorneys to classify claims in a grey area between the two extreme
classifications and may make it harder for an auditor to satisfactorily comply with
SFAS No. 5.
V. CONCLUSION
To really discover the adequacy or inadequacy of an attorney response to an
audit inquiry letter, one would have to make an after-the-fact comparison by
contrasting a material judgment to the attorney’s evaluation of the claim in his or her
response. However, this type of hindsight would seldom be practical. In any event,
the audit inquiry letter response can only disclose a limited amount of information.
The attorney may be unaware of accident reports, EEOC complaints, or cases
forwarded first to a company’s insurance carrier.
The time seems right for a “reeducation” of both attorneys and accountants.
A change in the ABA Statement making it less hostile to the process would be
productive. In light of recent corporate scandals, the audit inquiry letter arguably is
not doing enough to disclose potential loss contingencies. For example, the audit
inquiry letter could conceivably request information concerning other entities formed
on behalf of the corporate client during the year or for a summary of transactions
involving officers or directors. While the response to the audit inquiry letter may
leave something to be desired, court decisions over the past twenty years have only
hindered improvements to the process. In order to achieve meaningful change,
reeducation may need to include the courts themselves in addition to attorneys and
accountants.

